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TRIP-ping
Patents

Over

Business

Method

Vincent Chiappetta*
ABSTRACT

Professor Chiappetta argues that the current effort to
expand substantive internationalpatent law harmonization to
include business method patenting is ill-conceived and
unsupportable. Such patents cannot be justified on the economic
incentive grounds supporting the Western regimes. They are not
part of the existing TRIPS agreement, and under present
circumstances they should not be added. Any future agreement,
bi-lateral or multi-lateral (including an extension of TRIPS),
must be based on a better calibrated form of protection (less
than patent) and should occur only after the persistent
normative differences and the distributional consequences of
internationalsubstantive harmonization have been addressed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Eager to build on its successes under TRIPS (the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights),' the United

* Professor of Law, Willamette University, College of Law. I gratefully
acknowledge
a Willamette University College of Law writing grant made in connection with the
preparation of this Article, and thank Peter Yu and the Cardozo School of Law for the
invitation to the symposium which provided the impetus for embarking on this project.
1.
Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, Annex IC: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
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States has recently added business method patenting to the
international intellectual property harmonization agenda. 2 The
appropriate response to this effort, as to the more general attempt to
expand the scope of substantive patent harmonization, 3 is to
recognize that more of a bad thing will not make it better. In this
case, the "bad thing" includes both business method patenting and
further TRIPS-style harmonization. Regarding the former, business
method patents as such 4 are inconsistent with the market economics
5
incentive foundation on which the U.S. argument for coverage rests.
Concerning the latter, although TRIPS is undeniably a milestone in
intellectual property law harmonization, 6 it marks "progress" along

2.
Specifically, the United States has endeavored to broaden the scope of
patentable subject matter in connection with the on-going World Intellectual Property
Organization negotiations regarding a substantive patent law treaty. See May 2002
Draft Report, Seventh Session of the WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of
Patents,
159-73 (noting the U.S. position in
160-61) at http://www.ftc.gov/osl
ocmments/intelpropertycomments (appended to comments of Professor Brian Kahin,
University of Maryland, criticizing the U.S. position); "IndustrialApplicability" and
"Utility" Requirements: Commonalities and Differences, Ninth Session of the WIPO
Standing Committee on the Law of Patents (May 2003) (outlining the differences
between the two requirements for patentability) at http://www.wipo.org/scp/en
documents/session_9/index.htm [hereinafter WIPO Report]; Comments of Jon
Santamauro, Office of International Relations U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, at
Patent Law, Social Policy, and Public Interest, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law,
Nov. 7, 2002 (explaining the U.S. preference for an expansive view of patentable
subject matter, including business methods); cf. Doris Estelle Long, "Globalization:"A
Future Trend or a Satisfying Mirage, J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A., Part III, Second
Interdisciplinary Conference on the Impact of Technological Change on the Creation,
Dissemination, and Protection of Intellectual Property 313, 349 (Fall 2001) (noting the
inevitability of debates over extending protection to business methods).
3.
Attempts by the United States to expand patentable subject matter to
incorporate its concept of "utility" fail to consider either the economic cost-benefits of
patenting the less objective forms of innovation or the exacerbated effects on
distributional outcomes. See WIPO Report, supra note 2 (discussing the additional
issues of patenting aesthetic and more personal skills forms of innovation); Vincent
Chiappetta, Defining the Proper Scope of Internet Patents: If We Don't Know Where We
Want to Go, We're Unlikely to Get There, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV 289, 30618 (2000-2001) [hereinafter Chiappetta, Internet Patents]; John R. Thomas, The PostIndustrialPatent System, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 3, 54 (1999).
4.
A central issue in the debate is properly defining precisely what this term
covers, implementations or the processes themselves. See infra notes 9-14 and
accompanying text.
5.
See Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirabilityof Agreeing to Disagree:The WTO,
TRIPS, InternationalIPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INTER. L.
333, 335-36, 368 n.180 (2000) [hereinafter Chiappetta, WTO] (explaining that TRIPS
adopts and reflects the Western/NorthernU.S. market economic view of intellectual
property law); infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. But see id., at 375-81 (arguing
that although this policy drives the TRIPS rights, no actual international consensus
exists); Long, supra note 2, at 349 (noting that the amount of continuing debate hardly
indicates agreement).
6.
See Chiapetta, WTO, supra note 5, at 333-34; Fred H. Cate, Introduction
Sovereignty and the Globalization of Intellectual Property, 6. IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
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an ill-defined path prematurely taken, if not along the wrong path
entirely. 7 Not only is there no international consensus regarding the
inherent superiority of a market economics approach to intellectual
property rights, but much work remains to be done regarding the
related distributional inequities it generates, 8 as the developing
nations made quite clear at the recent, failed WTO negotiations in
Cancun, Mexico.

II. A DEFINITIONAL PREAMBLE
The inherent ambiguity (and malleability) of the basic
terminology of the debate makes a brief introductory foray into
lexicon imperative. The phrase "business method patents" has been
used to refer to the methodological concept for doing business, the
technological implementation of that process and combinations of the
two.9 Appropriate resolution of the business method patenting
question requires strict separation of process from tools. Applying the
incentive justifications supporting traditional patenting,' 0 it is
extremely difficult to argue against coverage of innovative

STUD. 1, 3 (1998); Harms Ullrich, TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade,
Adequate CompetitionPolicy, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 153, 158-60 (1995).
7.
See John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 686-92 (2002) (arguing that too much harmonization
threatens the valuable legal experimentation and evolution generated by diversity);
Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic,Outdated, and Overprotective,
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 615-16 (1996) (arguing that TRIPS imposes a western
intellectual property system); Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in
International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 813 (1989) (discussing the violation of principle of economic
sovereignty by states projecting their domestic policies in foreign states); see also,
Chiappetta, WTO, supranote 5, at 391-92 (discussing the benefits of diversity)).
8.
See id. at 370-81 and 383-92 (arguing that absent resolution of more
fundamental normative and distributional issues, substantive harmonization is
premature).
9.
See Chiappetta, Internet Patents, supra note 3, at 296-98.
10.
See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (briefly outlining the market
economic "public goods" incentives supporting argument for patent law). But see Mark
A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 137, 139 (2000); Comments of Josh Lerner, PTO Panel Discusses Incentives
Driving E-Commerce and Business Method Patents, Computer & Internet LawCast at
http://www.lawcast.com) (Aug. 14, 2000) (both noting the desirability of patent
incentives is subject to debate even within the market economic framework); infra
notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing the possible normative bases for
rejecting the public goods incentive approach entirely). Even if the parties agree on the
aggregate wealth benefits of tools patenting, that does not mean that they accept that
those benefits make such patenting desirable in light of other considerations. See infra
notes 59-112 and accompanying text.
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implementing technologies.1 1 That analysis and outcome, however, is
independent of the distinct issue now raised by the United States:
whether the business processes employing such tools should be
separately patentable. 12 Imprecise language, therefore, creates a risk
of confusing the benefits arising from encouraging investments in
implementation with virtues also supporting protection of the
underlying processes. If the business methods do not merit standalone rights, careless (or intentional) over-broad terminology allows
inappropriate subject matter into the patent regime, resulting in
costly over-protection. 13 To maintain clear focus on the actual debate
(the patentability of the business processes as distinct from the

11.
TRIPS reflects this position. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27 (including "all
fields of technology" within patentable subject matter). Although debate continues
regarding software, the clear trend appears to be to recognize computing
implementations (as opposed to software alone) as a field of technology. See Vincent
Chiappetta, Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an 'Article of
Manufacture:"Software, As Such as the Right Stuff 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 89 (1998) [hereinafter Chiappetta, Software Patents] (arguing for patentability
of software tools "as such"); infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text (discussing the
issue under the "industrial application" requirement).
12.
Patenting a tool "used in business" is not the same as patenting the
business method itself. Cf.In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 771, rev'd on other grounds,
sub nom. Dann. v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
13.
See infra note 53 and accompanying text. The same concern drove much of
the U.S. debate regarding the propriety of software patenting. Having already endured
the agony of straightening out the chaos arising from mingling "algorithms" (methods)
with tools (software), there is little value in rehashing the issue when addressing
business method patenting. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the
Patent and Copyright Paradigms,94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432 (1994); Pamela Samuelson,
Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other
Computer Program-RelatedInventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990); Pamela Samuelson
et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM
L. REV. 2308 (1994). But see Larry A. DiMatteo, The New "Problem"of Business Method
Patents: The Convergence of National Patent Laws and InternationalTransactions, 28
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 44-45 (2002). Professor DiMatteo states that
"recognition of business method patents is part of a natural process of recognizing the
inventive nature of modern technologies" and argues against making fine distinctions
between business methods and their electronic applications. The difficulty with the
argument is that the cited predicate fact ("some business methods and their electronic
applications are sufficiently inventive") does not support patenting of business methods
"as such." Failing to make the distinction permits unjustified over-protection of the
latter in the guise of protecting "their electronic applications." Nor do the associated
administrative costs stand as a barrier. Drawing the necessary distinction between
implementation and business method is relatively straight-forward, requiring only
proper assessment of the actual patent claims. Patentability does not turn on whether
computing structure or electronic implementation is recited, but whether the claims
only cover the specific technological implementation not the "business method" steps
standing alone (see Chiappetta, Software Patents, supra note 11, at 155-56) and the
requisite "inventiveness" lies in that claimed structure or implementation, not the
underlying method (see Chiappetta, Internet Patents, supra note 3, at 349-50).
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implementing tools) the methods are separately identified
as the
"competitive arts" for purposes of the following discussion. 14
"Harmonization" also raises crucial ambiguities, encompassing
uniformity in substantive requirements and rights (i.e., novelty,
terms of protection, right to exclude others), and procedural
implementations (i.e., application, searching, publication) or both. A
lack of precision can cause confusion between the undoubted
efficiency benefits of procedural uniformity and the need for a more
probing inquiry into the propriety of the substantive harmonization
on which it depends. 15 Once parties have agreed on substantive
objectives, there can be little honest debate regarding the desirability
of eliminating inconsistent or duplicative patent application and
examination procedures. 16 However, arguing these cost savings
mandate "harmonization" entirely misses (or intentionally obscures)
the point that no amount of implementing efficiency can justify
otherwise undesirable or unacceptable substantive results. The
decision uniformly to treat particular subject matter as patentable is
initially determined based only on whether that result furthers the
parties' objectives and interests.1 7 Until that has been established,
discussion of procedural cost savings is premature and irrelevant.
Applying this definitional framework, the more precise question
raised by the U.S. expansion effort is whether, on the substantive

14.
This clarification leaves open the question of whether the "competitive arts"
also includes products and services delivered by application of a methodology (for
example, cash management, legal or medical advice) or internal business management
techniques. The use of "competitive arts" in this Article covers only the core current
debate, the means used to market and deliver products to customers, leaving analysis
of these remaining issues for another day.
15.
As an example, Professor Duffy makes the point that presuming that
uniformity's efficiency benefits make harmonization desirable can mask the costs of
failing to maintain at least some diversity. See Duffy, supra note 7, at 687-89 (noting
that "the international patent community has taken as a given the value of creating
uniform patent law"), 700-01 (observing that efficiencies gained by economies of scale
do not "necessarily provide a reason to harmonize substantive law").
16.
A party might complain that they are disproportionately paying for or doing
the work or that the specific process is not the most effective means to deliver the
agreed upon objective. These valid arguments, however, do not affect the ultimate
desirability of appropriate procedural harmonization when there is accord on the
substantive objectives. Cf. Duffy, supra note 7, at 703-06 (pointing out that "the local
preferences argument [against harmonization] is less compelling where the diversity
occurs between nations having seemingly similar preferences," that is, when the
parties agree on substance).
17.
An argument that substantive uniformity itself reduces costs by
eliminating varying outcomes even more clearly fails to advance the debate. Although a
patent system will certainly be more cost efficient if everyone applies the same
requirements and provides the same rights, that efficiency is merely one of many
(frequently conflicting) considerations as to whether substantive uniformity is
desirable and certainly does not mandate agreement to whatever proposal is put forth
regardless of its other merits. See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
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merits, the international community should agree that competitive
arts innovation constitutes patentable subject matter. Thus,
clarifying the question also clarifies the arguments dictating a
negative response. First, the market economic framework driving the
U.S.18 pro-harmonization position does not support traditional patent
protection for the competitive arts. As the field has, at most, only a
very limited need for supplemental legal incentives spurring
investment in innovation, 20 years of virtually total patent
exclusivity 19 cannot deliver the net wealth benefits required to
20
support the regime.
Second, even if patenting did produce increases in aggregate
economic wealth, the current distributional imperfections in the
WTO/TRIPS market "globalization" effort 21 militate strongly against
a general agreement to extend protection. Competitive arts patents
clearly were not contemplated under TRIPS as originally
negotiated, 22 and adversely affected participants should resist any
further substantive harmonization absent changes that will assure
them appropriate participation in whatever benefits may result.
Before elaborating on these arguments, it is important to
emphasize that they do not stand as a categorical rejection of all
international harmonization regarding the competitive arts. Market
economic considerations likely do justify some, albeit substantially
less powerful, intellectual property rights (IPRs) in such
innovations. 23 Therefore, as particular parties resolve the related
distributional issues, the efficiencies arising from substantive and
procedural harmonization along these alternative lines can play an

18.
See supra note 5.
19.
See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 33 (setting 20 year term from date of filing),
art. 28 (granting the right to prevent third parties from making, using, offering for
sale, selling, or importing without authorization).
20.
The fundamental premise supporting the grant of a patent is that without
the related legal right to exclude, competitive appropriation will distort investment
decisions. See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
21.
The TRIPS agreement is part of the broader World Trade Organization
effort to create a global marketplace. See Frederick M. Abbot, First Report (Final)to the
Committee on International Trade Law of the International Law Association on the
Subject of ParallelImportation, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 607, 611, 617 (1998); Laurinda L.
Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual Property Norms in
International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 769, 782-83 (1997);
Paul Katzenberger & Annette Kur, TRIPS and Intellectual Property, 18 IIC STUDIES 1
(1996); TRIPS, supranote 1.
22.
See infra notes 71-96 and accompanying text.
23.
See DiMatteo, supra note 13, at 38-39 (noting a number of such proposals);
Reichman, supra note 13, at 2438-41, 2500-04 and 2510-19 (generally arguing that the
cheap and quick copying permitted by new technology calls for sui generis protection);
see also Chiappetta, Internet Patents, supra note 3, at 324-31 (proposing a specific sui
generis approach for Internet patents).
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extremely useful role, not only in the bi-lateral agreements, 24 but
perhaps in a future iteration of the TRIPS accord as well.

III. NET COSTS, NOT BENEFITS
Returning first to the premise that traditional patent incentives
are over-protective, the fundamental nature of the competitive arts
problem should be clearly understood. Much has been written about
the obstacles to properly identifying meritorious advance (novel and
non-obvious) in the business method field.25 The argument being
made here, however, is that no patent protection whatsoever is
justified. As even a competitive arts patent that is clearly both novel
and non-obvious cannot deliver net wealth benefits, the position
against competitive arts patenting is independent of the ability to
resolve these important, but secondary, examination difficulties.
Patent law's market economic rationale serves as the analytic
starting point. 26 In a market economy, investment in innovation is
generally driven by strong "natural" incentives.27 Those providing the
best (as measured by consumer demand) goods and services
("products") will prevail. 28 However, the market's invisible hand also
depends upon competitive appropriation of these new ideas by those
with more efficient and effective production and distribution skills,
ensuring the desired products are also provided at the lowest possible
cost. 29 Patent law intervention is employed to prevent these efficient

In addition to pushing for inclusion in a new multi-lateral patent treaty (see
24.
supra note 2), the United States has recognized the potential of bi-lateral agreements.
See, e.g., Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of TraditionalKnowledge, 33 CASE W.
RES. J. IN'L L. 233, 275 (2001); Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines
Campaign,20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 481, 520 (2002) (both noting the recent inclusion of business
method patent coverage in the U.S.-Jordan bilateral investment treaty); Sacha WunschVincent, The Digital Trade Agenda of the U.S.: ParallelTracks of Bilateral,Regional and
MultilateralLiberalization,58 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFr 7, 8, 10 (2003).

See, e.g., DiMatteo, supra note 13, at 39-44 (citing a number of sources);
25.
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263 (2000); John Kasdan, Obviousness and New
Technologies, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 159 (1999); Robert P.

Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999).

26.

See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-11 (1966) (tracing the origins

of U.S. patent law); ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGY AGE 10-16 (3d ed. 2003); Glynn S.

Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 440-55 (1999) (both explaining
the general "public goods-incentive" justification for patent law described below in the
text).
27.
See id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
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appropriators from overwhelming the innovators, avoiding the
resulting sub-optimal investment in new ideas by granting a timelimited legal right to prevent competitive adoption, which would
30
otherwise interfere with or destroy capture of appropriate returns.
However, as others have eloquently explained, intellectual property
intervention does not depend merely on the existence of this "freeriding" (competitive appropriation) but on sufficient levels of freeriding to actually cause sub-optimal investment relative to true
31
market demand.
A decision to extend patent protection to competitive arts
innovation, therefore, turns on the satisfaction of two conditions.
First, sufficient free-riding to trigger concern will only occur when
viable alternatives exist and the relative susceptibility to
appropriation (and resulting net returns on investment) makes
alternatives with lower actual market demand more attractive than
those with greater demand. 32 Second, traditional patent rights must
33
provide the proper response to the specific free-riding problem.
Even when distortive free-riding is present, patenting only makes
market economic sense if the resulting 20-year exclusion makes an
appropriate adjustment, generating wealth increases (through
supplemental innovation responding to the incentive) in excess of
related costs (the forgone benefits of efficient competitive adoption
during the patent term). 34 If not, patent law over-compensates, and
another, less powerful solution is required.
Stating these conditions in the affirmative, extending traditional
35
patent protection to the competitive arts requires the proponent
demonstrate that: (1) viable alternatives will cause sufficient freeriding to either redirect or reduce investment relative to actual
market demand, and (2) the related rights are appropriately
calibrated properly to adjust for the resulting distortions in optimal
investment patterns. Comparing the arguments on each point that

30.
The market economic approach to IPRs explicitly limits the rights and
related incentives to levels consistent with generating optimal investment. It does not
consider questions of "fairness" to the innovator, using and justifying individual
benefits as the means to accomplish this aggregate economic outcome. Cf. Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
219 (1954) (both making the point in connection with copyright law's similar incentive
structure).
31.
See Lunney, supra note 26, at 440-55 (developing this model in the context
of his discussion and rejection of the need for trademark incentives).
32.
See id.; Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, The
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm Ground, 70 MINN. L.

REV. 417, 438-42 (1985) (describing a four-part test guiding decisions to adopt new
intellectual property rights).
33.
Id.
34.

Id.

35.

Id.
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support traditional product patenting 36 with the situation facing the
competitive arts investor or innovator reveals that a pro-patenting
37
position is not justified.
First, it is highly unlikely that free-riding will significantly
distort competitive arts investment decisions. In the case of product
innovations, the variation in consumer preferences generates an
extremely wide range of investment options. 38 Because actual
demand is based on a product's specific characteristics, viable
investment options will exhibit markedly different levels of
susceptibility to competitive appropriation; that is, there is normally
no connection between whether a product innovation will be in high
39
or low demand and the ability of competitors to appropriate it.
There is good reason to believe, therefore, that product innovation
investments will be drawn away from those areas that offer less
insulation from competitive adoption (and lower net returns) and
toward those that offer more, independent of actual market
40
demand.
In contrast, the nature of the competitive arts alternatives
significantly reduces the possibility of such sub-optimal investment
allocations based on relative susceptibility to appropriation. Market
demand in the competitive arts is generally driven by only a single
consumer preference-lower transaction costs, thus drastically
41
limiting the viable alternatives to those that are the most efficient.
Additionally, the facts that most options must be made clearly visible

36.
Although the benefits of such patenting are a generally accepted
assumption, the definitive empirical case has yet to be made. See supra note 10
(offering sources disputing the need for any patent system).
37.
See Dreyfuss, supra note 25, at 274-76; Leo J. Raskind, The State Street
Bank Decision: the Bad Business of Unlimited Patent Protectionfor Methods of Doing
Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61, 77-78, 92-93 (1999); see
also Chiappetta, Internet Patents,supra note 3, at 319-24.
38.
See Chiapetta, Internet Patents, supranote 3, at 307-08.
39.
Id. at 320.
40.
For example, resources might disproportionately flow into developing
products, features or manufacturing processes which can be most effectively protected
by self-help and trade secret law. Even if true market demand is lower for those
investments, the net expected return may still be greater when the alternatives' higher
free-riding losses are taken into account. Id.
41.
In some cases customers will find separate "utility" in the novelty of using
the business methodology. Because customers may be willing to pay a premium for
obtaining that experience of using a business method beyond the value generated from
its efficiency in implementing another transaction, the question arises whether patent
law should spur innovation in these methods as distinct products. Although the issue is
beyond the scope of the current competitive arts inquiry there is good reason to suspect
that traditional patenting on this basis would generate more costs than benefits as a
result of the substantial adverse effects on the transactional competitive environment.
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in the targeted marketplace 42 and that there generally will be similar
(low) costs of appropriating all methods 43 eliminate any substantial
differences in susceptibility to appropriation. As a result, competitive
arts investment decisions are far more likely to be driven by
efficiency
responsiveness to actual customer demand for transactional 44
adoption.
competitive
of
risks
relative
the
by
redirected
than
The argument might, however, be made that rather than
arts
among
competitive
allocations
investment
distorting
such
high
general
generate
characteristics
these
same
alternatives,
risk of free-riding that the effect is dramatically to reduce, if not
eliminate, such investments altogether. Although a competitor has no
choice but to engage with the customer 4 5 the vulnerability of all
innovations to quick and cheap appropriation appears to militate
against making more than de minimus investments, thus limiting
competitive arts advance to, at most, insignificant incremental
the
distinctive
however,
closer inspection,
change. 46 On
this
outcome
make
arts
competition
competitive
characteristics of
arts,
competitive
in
the
unlikely. Even paradigm-shifting change
requires
generally
and
returns,
savings
which offers substantial
relatively low investment compared to the levels justifying product
patenting. 47 This form of idea development and testing does not
depend upon the significant time and capital associated with
experimental laboratory research and development work. 4 8 As a
consequence, the potential returns from an innovator's practical first

The problem described by Professor Reichman as "innovation bearing
42.
know-how on its face." See Reichman, supra note 13, at 2511-18.
Recall that the competitive arts refer only to the methodology (the
43.
intangible concept), not the implementing tools. See supra notes 9-14 and
accompanying text; infra notes 47-48; Chiappetta, Internet Patents, supra note 3, at
325-26 (describing the general ease with which all competitive arts innovations can be
appropriated).
See Chiapetta, Internet Patents,supra note 3, at 326.
44.
45.
See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as
Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 399 and 408-09 (1990)
(speaking of trademarks, no need to encourage businesses to develop tools to
communicate with customers); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public
Interest In the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1730 (1999) (noting that incentives
are not necessary to spur good advertising).
46.
See Chiappetta, Internet Patents, supra note 3, at 321-23 (elaborating on
the stasis concern set out in the following text above).
47.
See Raskind, supra note 37, at 81-82, 102.
48.
See id. The obvious example contrasts the enormous costs of
pharmaceutical development and regulatory approvals with the relatively inexpensive
development of a method of allocating customer calls. Cf. In re Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481
(C.C.P.A 1979). It is also important to remember that competitive arts development
does not include the investment in related implementing tools. Those investments
generate patentable subject matter, meaning those decisions do respond to the patent
incentive. See Chiappetta, Internet Patents,supra note 3, at 320 n.159.

2004]

BUSINESS METHOD PA TENTS

mover, lead-time and lock-in advantages over competitors 49 will in
many, if not most, cases provide sufficient returns to justify the
necessary investment, even in the face of a high risk of eventual
appropriation.50 Moreover, these same relatively low investment
requirements mean that competitive arts appropriation does not
provide the substantial cost-saving advantages over the innovator
driving product free-riding. As a result, the development cost savings
incentive to follow rather than to lead is replaced by pursuit of the
advantages of being first to market. Therefore, any company electing
to reduce or forgo investment in competitive arts innovation faces the
unhappy prospect that others will consistently remain at least a step
ahead by capturing sequential first-mover advantages. 51
The second condition, that patent rights make a proper
adjustment for the harms caused by free-riding, fares no better. The
above arguments do not mean that appropriation risks have no
adverse affect on investment in competitive arts innovation. However,
they do indicate that the amount of distortion will be relatively small,
requiring an equally mild intellectual property law response to rectify
the situation.52 Consequently, bringing the powerful exclusionary
rights of traditional patent law (precluding virtually all competitive
use for the term of the patent) to bear must substantially over-shoot
the "incentive" mark. The resulting over-protection is not without
consequence, inducing excessive investment relative to demand and,
at worst, generating unjustified monopolies and the related loss and
53
transfer of wealth.

49.
The first adopter in the marketplace stands to reap initial premiums while
competition "catches up" and can extend those premiums by taking steps to forestall
eventual transfers to adopting competitors. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 25, at 27072, 275; Lunney, supra note 26, at 452-53; Richard Schmalensee, Product
DifferentiationAdvantages of PioneeringBrands, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 349 (1982).
50.
The argument does not depend on competitive arts innovation requiring no
investment. There will be employee salaries, fees to consultants and "field" testing to
confirm and adjust the idea.
The point is that those costs will generally be
substantially lower than those required for product development (which involves those
expenditures plus laboratory research and development) and is consequently more
likely to be justified by the incentives of even temporary advantage. See Chiappetta,
Internet Patents,supra note 3, at 321-23; Raskind, supra note 37, at 81-82, 102.
51.
Although not rising to a definitive empirical case, the anecdotal evidence
certainly indicates no apparent shortage of competitive arts innovation without patent
protection, a fact entirely consistent with the theoretical analysis in the text. See
Lerner, supra note 10, at 112; Merges, supra note 25, at 582-83; Raskind, supra note
37, at 92-93. The existence of some innovation does not, however, equate to optimal
investment. Undoubtedly the ease of appropriation has some effect on levels of
investment, the point here being only that it is not sufficient to justify full-blown
traditional patent protection. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
52.
See discussion supranotes 33-34 and accompanying text.
53.
Unjustified intellectual property rights grant monopolies without offsetting
wealth benefits. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY,
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Finally, as discussed above, 54 these arguments against
traditional patent protection for the competitive arts cannot be
overcome by pointing to the benefits accruing from patenting the
related iniplement.ng tcch nol1.gy. The net wealth generated from
encouraging investments in innovative tools by extending protection
is irrelevant to the distinct issue of competitive arts "methods"
patenting. 55 Not only does excluding the latter have no effect on the
current protection offered to the former, but making the argument
56
unduly complicates reaching the proper outcome in both cases.
Market economic theory's failure to support patent protection
proves fatal to any effort to add the competitive arts to the
harmonized international patent regime. If such patents are
inappropriate in a national market economy, it certainly will not
improve matters to increase their negative effects by expanding
protection to the global marketplace. Nor can the cost savings derived
from international harmonization itself provide a supporting
rationale. Although such uniformity may reduce implementation
expense through procedural harmonization, the resulting ability more
cheaply to diminish global wealth through widespread, uniform overprotection is hardly a convincing argument. 57 In fact, as discussed
immediately below, 58 just as an argument for surplus protection
should raise suspicions of rent-seeking self-interest within a national
patent law debate, the international community should be equally
skeptical of the motivations of any nation making a similar proposal
in the global arena.

§ 1.3 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the adverse economic effects of monopoly); Lunney,
supra note 26 (making the point regarding over-protection of trademarks). This
outcome does not mean that all intellectual property protection must be withheld from
competitive arts innovation. It merely requires that the protection be differently
calibrated to ensure it delivers net benefits. See Chiappetta, Internet Patents, supra
note 3, at 324-48 (arguing for a limited form of "head-start" protection).
54.
See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
55.
See id.
56.
See id. (explaining the need and administrative feasibility of separating the
issues); infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (discussing the current confusion,
particularly in Europe and to a lesser extent Japan); supra note 13 (discussing the U.S.
experience with software patenting).
57.
But see Toshiko Takenaka, Internationaland Comparative Perspectives on
Internet Patents, 7

MICH.

TELECOMM.

& TECH.

L. REV.

423,

426

(2000-2001)

(incorporating the competitive arts in TRIPS effectively harmonizes, thus avoiding the
senseless need to renegotiate TRIPS); Jason Taketa, The Future of Business Method
Software Patents in the InternationalIntellectual Property System, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
943, 967-73 (2002) (arguing the benefits of uniformity).
58.
See discussion infra Part V.
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IV. THE DISTRIBUTIONAL PROBLEM
Even if aggregate wealth benefits should accrue from competitive
arts patenting, for those benefits to justify international
harmonization, the participants must believe that the former is the
sole consideration dictating pursuit of the latter. If more is at issue in
the harmonization inquiry, the parties may decide to forgo even net
positive economic results in favor of other superceding objectives. As
it turns out, those "other" considerations play a determinative role in
IPR harmonization.
At the most fundamental level, nations have differing views
regarding their individual citizens' expected contribution to and
return from their economies, ranging from abnegation of virtually all
personal interest, to notions of equality in participation, to explicitly
fostering independently determined, self-interested action. 59 This
basic disagreement means that the desirability of net wealth
maximizing Western/Northern
incentive-based
IPR regimes,
including patenting, is hardly a given.60 A society that does not
believe that personal return should motivate decisions, or that
increasing aggregate economic output is the most important
consideration, will resist such regimes as affirmatively fostering
undesirable
decision-making
paradigms
and related
social
outcomes. 6 1 Consequently, for some societies the question of
competitive arts patenting will never reach its aggregate wealth
economic merits, whatever they may be, but will fail at the threshold
62
impropriety of all patenting.

59.

See, e.g., WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE 9-

29 (1995); David Hurlbut, Fixing the Biodiversity Convention: Toward a Special
Protocol for Related Intellectual Property, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 379, 382-88 (1994);
Doris Estelle Long, The Protection of Information Technology in a Culturally Diverse
Marketplace, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 129, 148 n. 68, 156-57; see also
Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to
Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1 (2001)
(offering an excellent discussion of how these differing world views affect the United
States-Chinese intellectual property discussions).
60.
See Peter K. Yu, The Harmonization Game: What Basketball Can Teach
About Intellectual Property and InternationalTrade, 26 FORDHAM IN'L L.J. 218, 23132 (2003).
61.
Id. at 230-32.
62.
See id.
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For the more pragmatic (or cynical), 63 even if parties agreed on
the general desirability of using the market economy approach, any
actual accord must also address and resolve that model's significant
distributional consequences. 64 Before signing on, a prospective
adherent must consider whether its share of the resulting net
benefits is acceptable under the circumstances (a point forcefully
made by the developing nations recently in Cancun).6 5 As the explicit
purpose of incorporating patenting into a market model is
redistributional, 66 the effects of related substantive harmonization
must be carefully assessed. Regarding the baseline decision of
whether to offer protection, even when the result is a demonstrable
increase in innovation and related increase in aggregate wealth, the
supporting costs which produce those outcomes (transfers of
consumer surplus and deadweight loss) 67 will be borne
disproportionately by societies less likely to produce the covered class
of innovation. 68 Moreover, because traditional patenting is a "race"
system, 69 these distributional effects will occur not only when a

63.
See William P. Alford, Making the World Safe for What? Intellectual
Property Rights, Human Rights and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-European
Cold War World, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 135, 140-41 (1996) (noting that assertions
of different norms cannot necessarily be taken at face value).
64.
See Chiappetta, WTO, supra note 5, at 347-54, 368-70 (discussing how the
issue affects the debate over international IPR exhaustion).
65.
The concern is not uniquely applicable to international patent
harmonization. Members of any economic system, international, regional, national,
local or joint business venture, should consider the distributional consequences of the
proposed arrangements.
66.
As discussed above, the very point of a traditional patent regime is to
ensure the inventor captures "rents" by restricting competitive appropriation. See
supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
67.
Although these bland economic terms sound relatively innocuous,
"deadweight loss," for example, translates into real world lack of access to essential
pharmaceutical therapies. That particular issue has been of significant concern in the
recent WTO discussions. See, e.g., WTO Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, 9-14
November 2001, Ministerial Declaration adopted on Nov. 14, 2001 (the "Doha
Declaration"), available at http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/minist-e/min0l_e/
mindedle.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003); Nermien A1-Ali, The Egyptian
PharmaceuticalIndustry after TRIPS-A Practitioner'sView, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
274, 275 (2003); Jean 0. Lanjouw, A New Global Patent Regime for Diseases: U.S. and
InternationalLegal Issues, 16 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 85 (2002).
68.
A number of scholars have cast the TRIPS issue as a contest between
developed and developing nations on this basis. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism,
Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of
InternationalIntellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 57
(1998); A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of Economic
Imperialism,"29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415, 455 (1996). Nor does the argument in the
text take into account the further wealth transfers if a patent regime's rules permit
capture of products or methods previously in use locally. See, e.g., Doris Estelle Long,
The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual Property
Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229, 263-80 (1998).
69.
In most patent systems the patent race goes to the first inventor to file. The
United States uniquely gives priority to the first to invent, a system which somewhat
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society is less innovative overall, but also when resource constraints
slow the local pace of innovation. 70 No rational economic actor in such
a disadvantaged position should agree to coverage unless other
aspects of the agreement offset these burdens.
The above analysis does not argue, however, that parties should
never agree on substantive patent law harmonization, merely that
acceptable distributional consequences are an essential component of
reaching such an accord. Assessed in this light, the ratification of
TRIPS provides powerful evidence that its signatories, in fact, must
have determined that, when considered in the larger WTO context, its
harmonized IPRs offered not only aggregate economic benefits but
also appropriate distributional outcomes. 71 Even if one believes that
to be the case (despite evidence to the contrary),7 2 as demonstrated
below, that position cannot be extrapolated into an argument that
TRIPS resolved the competitive arts question in favor of
patentability.
The most straightforward "existing agreement" argument is that
the words and structure of Article 27 of TRIPS 73 demonstrate the
parties' intention to include competitive arts patenting. That
provision can be reasonably viewed as embodying an extremely far
reaching accord on patentable subject matter. 74 Article 27(1) calls for
signatories to make patents "available for any inventions, whether
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they
are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial
application. '75 The requirements of "invention," "field of technology,"
and "industrial application," as well as the modifiers "any," "all" and
"capable," are certainly expansive and inclusive. 76 Additionally, under
general cannons of construction, the provision's list of specific
exclusions 77 should limit any carve-outs to the enumerated classes. 78

levels the resource "playing field," but a point of some international contention in its
own right. See, e.g., Lee J. Schroeder, The Harmonization of Patent Laws, C567 ALIABA 473, 480-81 (2003) (discussing the two systems and harmonization issues). See
also Donald W. Banner, DiscordantAspects of Harmonization,85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC. 172, 176 (2003) (noting the benefits to resource rich patent applicants of a
first to file system); James E. White, The U.S. First-to-Invent System, The Mossinghoff
Conclusion, and Statistics, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC. 357, 363 (2003) (noting

the converse economic benefits of a first-to-invent rule for small inventors).
70.
See id.
71.
See Chiappetta WTO, supra note 5, at 370-71.
72.
See id. at 371-73; Hamilton, supra note 7, at 616; Long, supra note 2, at
349.
73.
TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27.
74.
See id.
75.
See id. art. 27(1).
76.
See id.
77.
See id. arts. 27(2), 27(3) (permitting local exclusion, respectively, of (1)
inventions "necessary to protect ordre public," morality, life/health (human, animal or
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As competitive arts innovations ("any invention") apply knowledge to
the solution of real world problems ("a field of technology") relevant to
commerce ("industrial application") and do not fall within the listed
exclusions, they appear to fit comfortably within the language of the
treaty.

79

Despite the legitimate appeal of this "plain meaning" approach,
treaty language cannot be read in a vacuum but must be interpreted
in light of contemporaneous usage and technical definitions.8 0 The
above argument ignores the actual meaning of the key terms in
international patent law given the status of competitive arts
8l
patenting at the time of the TRIPS negotiation.
European and Japanese patent law provide direct evidence of the
limited reach intended by "field of technology" and "industrial
application," as used in TRIPS.8 2 The European Patent Convention
(EPC) explicitly requires a patentable invention be "susceptible of
industrial application. 8 3 Despite the EPC's broad definition of
"industrial application" regarding field of endeavor, 84 the additional
requirements that a patentable invention be of a technical nature,
concerned with the solution of a technical problem and have technical
features,8 5 read in conjunction with the specific exclusion of "business
methods,"8 6 make it apparent that the competitive arts were
explicitly excluded. Although the European courts continue to

plant) or the environment and (2) "diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for
treatment of humans or animals" and plants and animals (other than microorganisms)
and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals).
78.
See Jose I. De Santiago, Patentability of Business Methods in Mexico, 14
AUT. INT'L L. PRACTICUM 126, 127 (2001) (noting the lack of a specific exception argues
for coverage); Taketa, supra note 57, at 965 (noting, but not supporting, the argument
in the text).
79.
See TRIPS, supra note 1.
80.
See generally John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker:
Comparative Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
727 (2002).
81.
See id. at 754.
82.
The pre- and post-TRIPS European and Japanese positions regarding
business method patenting have been extensively chronicled. See, e.g., DiMatteo, supra
note 13, at 25-38; Andre J. Porter, Should Business Method Patents Continue to Be
Patentable?, 29 S.U. L. REV. 225, 245-54 (2002); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the
Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1178-83 (1999); Taketa, supra note 57, at 96267 (2002); Joy Y. Xiang, Comment, How Wide Should the Gate of 'Technology" Be?
Patentabilityof Business Methods in China, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POLY J. 795, 808-11 (2002).
83.
See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 13
I.L.M. 268 (1974) (amended by Decision of the Administration Council of the European
Patent Organization of Dec. 21, 1978) [hereinafter EPC].
84.
See id. art. 57; WIPO Report, supra note 2.
85.
EPC, supra note 83, rules 27, 29; Guidelines for Examination in the
European Patent Office, Part C, Chapter IV, available at http://www.european-patentoffice.org/legal/gui-lines/index.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
86.
EPC, supra note 83, art. 52(2) (c).
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struggle with the confusion between process and tools8 7 (in a fashion
disquietingly reminiscent of the U.S. "physical effects" doctrine,
unsuccessfully applied in the agonized debate over patentability of
computer software),8 8 the decisions clearly placed the competitive
arts as such (independent of implementing structure) outside the
8' 9
scope of both "fields of technology" and "industrial application.
Although Japanese patent law does not explicitly reject business
method patenting, it similarly restricts the reading of its "industrial
application" requirement to the "creation of technical ideas utilizing
natural laws." 90 The Japanese courts have consistently interpreted
this requirement as limiting patentable business method claims to
those setting out computing-based implementations rather than mere
competitive arts innovation standing alone. 9 1
Finally, U.S. patent law at the time was consistent with these
European
and
Japanese
interpretations. 92
The
generally
acknowledged (if criticized) U.S. "business method" exception was
only disposed of by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 93 four

87.
See, e.g., DiMatteo, supra note 13, at 30-38; Porter, supra note 82, at 24751; Thomas, supra note 82, at 1179; Taketa, supra note 57, at 966 (arguing that even
software implementations may not be covered by TRIPS); DORIS ESTELLE LONG &
ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 933-35 (2000) (reviewing

a variety of European Patent Office cases); WIPO Report, supra note 2 (discussing
some of the differences between "industrial application" and the U.S. requirement of
utility).
88.
See Chiappetta, Internet Patents, supra note 3, at 303-04 (briefly
summarizing the doctrine's history and its final abandonment in the State Street Bank
case).
89.
See DiMatteo, supra note 13, at 30; Duffy, supra note 7, at 717; Porter,
supranote 82, at 247-48.
90.
See Thomas, supra note 82, at 1179-80 (generally describing the basic
requirements); Xiang, supra note 82, at 808.
91.
See DiMatteo, supra note 13, at 28-30; Porter, supra note 82, at 251-53;
Taketa, supra note 57, at 956; Xiang, supra note 82, at 808-09 (all discussing the
apparent recent softening of the Japanese position regarding computing
implementations, but continued resistance to the non-technical competitive arts
method itself). Although both the Europeans and the Japanese are considering the
possibility of extending patent protection to business methods, see, e.g., Duffy, supra
note 7, at 717 n. 104 (noting the possible future relaxation of the requirement to
include business method patenting), that evolution is occurring in spite of, not
consistent with their historical views of the "industrial arts" language used in TRIPS.
The willingness to consider change actually strongly supports the lack of pre-existing
coverage. See WIPO Report, supra note 2.
92.
See Xiang, supra note 82, at 806 (citing Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine
Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908)).
93.
The doctrine was expressly abandoned in State Street Bank & Trust v.
Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.Cir. 1998). See generally Rinaldo Del
Gallo III, Are "Methods of Doing Business" Finally Out of Business as a Statutory
Rejection?, 38 IDEA: J. L. & TECH. 403 (1997) (offering a good history of the exception);
Thomas, supra note 3 (offering a good analysis of the decision).
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years after the 1994 finalization of the TRIPS accord. 94 Consequently,
the United States certainly could not have believed "field of
technology" and "industrial application" in TRIPS covered business
methods (to say nothing of the competitive arts), as that would have
required anticipating their inclusion based on a judicial change of
heart in a case yet to be decided even by the trial court. 9 5
A TRIPS harmonization enthusiast could argue, however, that
focusing on contemporaneous legal interpretations ignores the actual
objectives of the TRIPS signatories. Specifically, one could interpret
the agreement as embodying a desire to eliminate the constraints of
past limiting interpretations, permitting international substantive
harmonization to move forward on a self-implementing, expanding
basis. Consequently, the treaty language should be read broadly
precisely to anticipate and incorporate the inevitable future evolution
of the parties' views on patentable innovations, exactly as is presently
96
occurring regarding business method patenting.
The history of the TRIPS negotiations, however, does not support
this position. 97 The substantive agreements and related language
were all hard fought, with the losers being frequently reluctant
participants faced with a choice among bad and worse options. 98 The
relevant point for this discussion, however, does not turn on whether
those parties only agreed under duress or knowingly and
intentionally accepted the bad with the good. It only requires
recognizing that under the circumstances they intended, at most, a
limited bargain. Consequently, even if TRIPS implements mutually
acceptable harmonization, its scope is restricted to the precise treaty
language interpreted within its contemporaneous context. 99 On that

94.
See TRIPS, supra note 1 (noting the 1994 signature date of the accord).
95.
The trial court, in fact, expressly reinforced its finding of unpatentability by
reference to the "business method exception." Additionally, there is an excellent
argument that the State Street Bank reversal says nothing about the patentability of
the competitive arts as such, the elimination of the business method exception being
mere dicta in light of the holding that technical implementation sufficed to make the
exclusively hardware claims actually before the court patentable subject matter. See
Thomas, supra note 82, at 1158-61.
96.
Cf. Takenaka, supra note 57, at 426 (arguing against narrow
interpretations as giving "room to developing countries to refuse traditional intellectual
property protection for new types of technology" and undermining the benefits of
international harmonization by requiring additional negotiations). See supra notes 9195 (discussing, respectively, the evolution in the European/Japanese and the U.S.
positions).
97.
See Chiappetta, WTO, supra note 5, at 344-46 (describing the TRIPS
negotiation process).
98.
Id. at 370-81 (making the point and citing sources); Long, supra note 2, at
349.
99.
See supranotes 80-95 and accompanying text.
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basis, it is abundantly clear the accord cannot be read as
contemplating coverage of the competitive arts. 10 0
The above discussion, of course, only argues that the competitive
arts do not fall within TRIPS as actually agreed, not that the parties
should not now negotiate an appropriate extension. However, when
the competitive arts patenting issue is left for consideration on its
own merits, a pro-patent position not only will be, but should be,
rejected. Those that express concerns with substantive IPR
harmonization (in TRIPS and beyond) are not merely petulantly
refusing to enter a golden global economic age.10 1 Rather, as
discussed above,' 0 2 their arguments are predicated on significant and
real concerns about the appropriate role and effects of intellectual
property protection in such an economy. Even assuming advocates of
more communitarian forms of global socio-economic order were
willing to acknowledge the practical (if perhaps only interim) need to
employ Adam Smith's economic market10 3 and the related desirability
of IPR interventions,1 0 4 those suffering disproportionate burdens will
understandably find further IPR expansion problematic, unless their
distributional concerns are satisfactorily addressed.
As the key factor affecting IPR distributional consequences is the
party's relative ability to capture the resulting preferential
returns,10 5 it might be argued that competitive arts patenting offers
an equalizing opportunity for developing nations. 10 6 Their economies
lack the resources necessary for meaningful participation in capital
intensive technological innovation, leaving them as net consumers
and transferors of the wealth providing the return on investment
necessary to make the patent machine work.' 0 7 In contrast,

100.
Or, for that matter, innovation in any field beyond the contemporaneous
limited view of the reach of the "industrial arts." See WIPO Report, supra note 2
(noting the current inquiry into using a more generous "utility" standard).
101.
See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
102.
Id.
103.
See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
104.
See id.
105.
See id.
106.
The argument is similar to that made in support of business method
patenting within a specific national jurisdiction: encouraging innovation by small firms
will help make them more competitive with larger and even dominant firms. See, e.g.,
DiMatteo, supra note 13, at 22-23; Xiang, supra note 82, at 814 (both noting but not
making or supporting the argument). As both commentators point out, and as noted in
the text above, that theoretical outcome is likely not to materialize in practice. There is
no assurance that small companies will be first out of the blocks, particularly in a first
to file system. See supra note 69. Just as such companies may face yet higher barriers
to entry raised by resource-rich larger enterprises in a national regime, international
business method patenting may merely further exacerbate the distributional position
of less developed countries unable to divert their people and resources from more
pressing basic needs.
107.
See supranote 68 and accompanying text.
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competitive arts innovation (as distinct from implementation)
generally requires only astute and creative people observing,
10 8
analyzing, and improving the processes of marketplace exchange.
On this more level playing field, developing countries may stand a
much better chance of being net innovators and, therefore,
transferees of wealth. Consequently, harmonized WTO-wide patent
protection for the competitive arts may offer an opportunity to
partially "rebalance" the present distribution of returns on
innovation.
Although alluring, the likelihood of this actually occurring is
remote. The current state of play regarding competitive arts
innovation in developed economies strongly suggests that without
further evolution in approach, protection would apply (albeit
inappropriately) only to a combination of competitive arts process and
technological implementation. 0 9 Such an outcome would continue to
favor economies that have the resources to develop the implementing
tools, merely exacerbating the existing distributional situation. 110
Even if the major players are willing to reach a compromise"' in
favor of pure competitive arts patenting, a new obstacle would
undoubtedly stand in the way. The same lower investment
requirements that level the field for resource-poor developing
economies would then make it all the more apparent that such patent
protection will generate net economic costs. 1 1 2 Consequently, having
successfully disconnected process and tools to regain parity,
proponents of competitive arts patenting will (not without irony) face
the persuasive argument that it makes no sense to use IPRs merely
to redistribute wealth when the net result is to create even less to go
around.

V. CONCLUSION
Competitive arts patenting currently has no place in harmonized
substantive international patent law. It cannot be justified on market
economic grounds, it is not part of the agreement reached under
TRIPS, 113 and under the present circumstances it should not be
added. This is not to say that competitive arts should be permanently

108.
See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
109.
See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
110.
See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
111.
There is nothing "wrong' with pursuing self-interest in negotiations,
however, self-interest does not provide a basis for reaching agreement with others not
similarly situated. Recognizing the benefits to developed nations of the current "mixed"
form of competitive arts patenting (method plus tools), means a substantive
compromise will be required.
112.
See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
113.
See supra notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
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and entirely excluded from international intellectual property law
harmonization efforts. As national experience grows and local
community
will
mature," 4
the
international
experiments
of
the
understanding
to
a
better
working
undoubtedly come
processes
and
their
competitive
arts
distinction
between
important
implementing technologies. Regarding the former, a "something other
than patent" approach that avoids over-protection may eventually
emerge. 115 Combined with an increased understanding of the
normative and distributional consequences of IPR harmonization, the
mechanisms will then be in place for reaching mutually acceptable
and beneficial agreements 1 6 including, perhaps, adding appropriate
1 7
competitive arts coverage to a future, expanded version of TRIPS.

114.
See Duffy, supra note 7, at 717 (making his point regarding the value of
diversity in the context of business method patenting); supra notes 91-95 (noting the
current rethinking of business method patenting in Europe, Japan, and the United
States).
See Chiappetta, Internet Patents, supra note 3, at 331-48 (making such a
115.
proposal).
116.
See Chiappetta, WTO, supra note 5, at 387-88 (arguing the propriety of
agreements among concurring parties).
117.
This will require new negotiations. However, that is neither a bad or
senseless thing, but rather a necessary step to ensure an appropriate resolution of all
aspects of the harmonization issue. But see Takenaka, supranote 57, at 426.
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